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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

I

K. F. ACH'rER and RUTH A.
·
ACHTER, his wife,
Plciintiffs and Appellants,

Case No.

vs.
KEI'l1H 'W. MA 'V and EVELYN G.
MAvV, his wife,
Defendants and Respondc11ts.

12317

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
NATURg OF THE· CASE
This is an action to establish a boundary line by
interpretation of documents, by oral agreement of the
parties and by estoppel.
DISPOSITION OF CASE IN LOvVER COURT
The Honorable Thornley K. Swan in Davis County
held that oral agreement of the parties established the
position of the defendants and that the plaintiffs failed
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in their proof of grounds for estoppel or agreement or
interpretation of documents.
NATURE OF RELIEF 80UGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants seek review of the evidence on the estoppel issue and of the documents in evidence and interpretation of the documents, and an order either that
there be a new trial or that the Court erred in not giving
judgment for the plaintiffs.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Western National Investment <_;ompany owned a
tract of some forty-three acres in Davis County on both
sides of the North Fork of Holmes Creek, and placed
title in LeR Burton, a real estate agent to whom it owed
money, who had the
placed in the name of LeR,
a corporation which was owned by LeR Burton (Ex. 1,
4 and 7). The defendants Maw and the Willard Mortons
approached LeR Burton to acquire a portion of the land
(Tr. 247). The original Earnest Money Receipt as written up by them was for ten acres, which was changed to
a somewhat larger tract (Ex. 2 and 3), and then conveyed
June 1, 1965 (Ex. 4). The terrain is wooded, hilly and
in parts precipitous, with a stream flowing down the
center and a 20-foot waterfall some GOO feet from the
East bou;ndary.
Messrs. Morton, Maw and Burton laid out a tract
at the South end of the larger tract and prepared Exhibit 2 as representing their agreement. rrr. 13-16, 253-

255, 380)
(NOTE: The Abstract of rrestimony uses references
to the pages of the transcript of testimony and abstracts
the testimony in consecutive order. References herein
will, therefore>, be to the pages of the transcript which
can be found either in the transcript or by reference to
the Abstract in the consecutive order of the transcript
pages.)
l\lr. Burton testified that the first point West of
the Bast boundary on the North side of the tract was
established as being substantially South of a ledge overlooking the waterfall basin (Tr. 18 and 20), and Messrs.
:Morton and :Maw testified that this point was 25 or 30
or 40 f Pet Southwest of the waterfall overlook (Tr. 265,
286, 287, 300, 382, 383, 392), and that the deed (Ex. 4)
was intended to go to the edge of the ledge overlooking
the waterfall (Tr. 278, 315 and 395).

Following the giving of the deed, Messrs. Maw and
Morton had Rodney Dahl make a survey of the land conwyed to Maw. They all testified that they assisted him
in making the survey and led him to the point at the
edge of the ledge (Tr. 221, 323 and 453).
Following the making of this survey and the placing
of a pipe and a tack at the point near the waterfall,
which was called Pl by the Court and appears as Pl on
Exhibit A,
Burton pulled ont the stake and the tack
(Tr. 34, 87 and 397) and infornwd Messrs. Maw and
Morton that they were claiming too much ground (Tr.
32(), 400), and when Mr. Maw put some paint in the
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stakehole (Tr. 398), Mr. Burton hammered out the rock
to obliterate the mark (Tr. 399, 372).
Mr. and Mrs. Morton had an interest in the tract
which was conveyed by a deed made in January, 1967,
and recorded in December, 19G8 (Ex. 21).
The plaintiffs had seen the property in 1965 and
1966 and seriously negotiated for the remainder of the
entire tract in 1967 ('11 r. 1G5, 166). Mr. Burton informed
the Achters of the dispute as to the proximity of the
defendants' boundary to the waterfall area (Tr. 42, 46,
111, 170, 197) and they were willing to buy only if that
point, and other disputes concerning location of a roadway and location of a fence along the creek, would be
resolved (Tr. 47, 118, 155, 178 and Ex. 8). '11 he plaintiffs'
offer on August 2, 1967, was to purchase the a proximately 32 acres "subject to the buyer making personal inspection of the survey staked as referred herein and approving in writing the boundary as shown by said survey on
or before August 20, 1967. If said boundary is not approved, the return of the earnest money shall void this
offer without harm to anyone concerned." (Ex. 8)
Mr. Burton and Mr. Achter testified that following
a further survey by l\fr. Dahl (Ex. 5), Messrs. Burton
and Achter walked the ground, discussed the boundary,
particularly at the point opposite the waterfall, discussed the use of the wrong roadway and the existence
of the defendants' fence on the North side of the creek,
and then had conversation with the defendant Keith Maw
to resolve the disputed points (Tr. 59-66, 176-177, 203).
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Mr. Burton and Mr. Achter testified that in this conversation the newly placed stake was discussed with Mr.
he knew where it was, and Mr. Maw was
Maw, who
told that Mr. Achter wanted to buy the property North
of the defendants if the dispute could be resolved and
invited Mr. Maw to go look at the stake to make certain,
and Mr. :Maw declined, said he knew where the stake
was and that that was the boundary (Tr. 65-66, 177).
Mr. Maw testified that Burton talked about the boundary
in July, 1967 (Tr. 400-401) and August 22 or 23, 1967,
Burton and Achter came together and discussed the
boundary (Tr. 402-406) and in May, 1968 Achter Caine
alone (Tr. 411). Mrs . .Maw testified that Burton and
Achter came together in July, 1967 and didn't mention
the boundary (Tr. 344-345); Mr. Burton came alone
August 12, 1967 and didn't mention the boundary err.
346) and Burton and Achter eame together later in
August and didn't mention a boundary line problem (Tr.
347-348), and in May, 1968 Achter came alone and discussed the boundary (Tr. 354-355).
Mr. Burton assisted Mr. Dahl in the survey which
is Exhibit 5 and in the location of what the Court called
"point PB," which is the point opposite the waterfall,
as shown on Exhibits 5, 6 and A (Tr. 56, 217).
The changes in the descriptions in Exhibit 2, 3 and 4
as to the critical point are shown on Exhibit 22. Rodney
Dahl, the surveyor, testified that these changes were
inconsPqnential (Tr. 234) and that in his opinion the
proper construction was to let the "monument" control
('l1r.
and that "being on top of the South rim of
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the North Fork of Holmes Creek" does not suggest anything different from the "edge" (Tr. 231).
Alton F. Lund, an attorney experienced in title matters (Tr. 457), testified that the reference in Exhibit 4
was not to a monument (Tr. 4GO) and that the distance
call should control ('l1r. 4G2) and that if it were interpreted as referring to a monument, it would be more·
logical to go to the high point 226 feet from the South
boundary rather than to the edge of the ledge 378 feet
from the South boundary on the call of 300 feet, more or
less (Tr. 470-471). Mr. Lund testified that viewing the
premises would be helpful (Tr. 471) and was shown a
picture of the disputed point (Ex. 25), which confirmed
his opinions (Tr. 492).
At the conclusion of the trial the court viewed the
premises (Tr. 511).
The Court's Memorandum Decision was as follows:

"1. That the plaintiffs failed to meet their burden
of proof and contention that .PB was the point
agreed upon by defendants and their grantor LeR
Burton, and that defendants and Burton did
agree upon a point referred to as P 1.
"2. That plaintiffs failed to sustain their burden
of proof that defendants agreed to the survey of
August 12, 1967 and that defrndants in fact always contended that the boundan· was established at .P 1 in accordance with the prior Rodney L. Dahl survey." (R. 15)
The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and J udgment were made and entered September 17, 1970, and a
Motion for New Trial or to Amend the Judgment was
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filed September 2G, 1970 (R. 2G-28), argned October 13,
1970 (R. 29), and denied October 30, 1970 (R. 30).

POINTS OJ? ARGUMENT
1. Defendants should be held estopped to claim beyond the 300-foot stake.
2. There was no agreement as to the point near
the waterfall.
3. In the absence of agreement, the descriptions are
ambiguous and the measurements should control.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANTS SHOULD BE HELD ESTOPPED
TO CLAIM BEYOND THE 300-FOOT POINT.

r:L1he issue of estoppel was raised by the third cause
of action of the amended complaint (R. 3), which alleges
that Maw and Achter acting for their wives met at the
property following the August survey and that defendants were advised that unless a boundary could be
established in the waterfall area, plaintiffs would not
imrchase; the defendant said he was acquainted with the
survey just made and that it was agreeable; and in reliance on the statenumt and convl•rsation, the plaintiffs
imrehas1:_•d thP propert:·, rel:ring on the point established
I>;· that conv<'rsation, and that defendants should be
Pstopped to den;· thl' boundary point as approximately
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78 feet South of the point overlooking the waterfall.
In its Memorandum Decision (R.14) the Court did
not refer specifically to the isime of estoppel and simply
found the issues in fayor of the <lefendants. In Finding
of Fact No. 8, the Court found that plaintiffs failed to
sustain the allegations of the second and third causes of
action and "that the defendants are not estopped to deny
the establislunent of the disputed point as bt>ing the point
identified as P 1, to-wit, as described in paragraph 7 of
these Findings of
(R. 20)
It is appellants' position that estoppel is an equitable

plea and that the evidence is reviewable
the Court;
and that if the evidence clearly preponderates against
the decision, this Court can and will do equity. Corbet
v. Corbet, 24 Utah 2.d 378, 381, 472 P.2d 430; Super Tire
Market, Inc. v. Rollins, 18 Utah 2d 122, 125, 417P.2d132;
Givan v. Lambeth, 10 Utah 2d 287, 288-289, 351 P.2d 959.
The language used by this Court in Chevron Oil
Company v. Beat:er Coi11nty, 22 Utah 2d 143 at 146, 449
P.2d 989, is:
"This being an equitable proceeding, we may review the findings but should not distrub them
unless they are clearly against the weight of the
evidence. Shaw v. Jevson, 121Utah155, 239 P.2d
745 (1952)"
The evidence and the equities are so strong in favor
of the plaintiffs on the issue of estoppel that this Court
should overrule the District Court and find that the
defendants should be es topped to deny the establishment
of the point by the conversation arranged for that pur-
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pose, and either order a new trial or direct the entry
of judgment.

r_rhe exisknce of a dispute as to the boundary by
August 2, 19GI was known to Burton (11 • 41, 122, 114),
Morton (11 • 2SG, 31S, Ex. 21), Maw (rr. 397, 400), Achter
(T. 170) and Dahl (T. 221). rrhe Achters, on or about
August 2, 19G7, walked over the property and entered
into the Earnest Money Agreement (Ex. 8), which reserved to the bnyn "personal inspection of the survey
staked as referred herein and approving in writing the
boundary as shown by said survey on or before August
20, 1967." The Earnest Money Agreement went on to
recite that if the boundary was not approved in that
manner, the return of the earnest money would void the
offer.
The required survey was made by Mr. Dahl on August 12 and the drawing became mxhibit 5. On the day
of the survey, ·which was Saturday, August 12, Mr. Burton and Mr. Achter went over the entire area and
especially the area at the waterfall, and observed the
stake at point PB 78.15 feet South of the edge of the
ledge overlooking the waterfall (T. 175), and they proceeded to find Mr. Maw to settle the three points of the
boundary at the waterfall, the fences which were North
of the creek, and use of the wrong right-of-way (T'r. 176177). The con versa ti on was long; it was specific as to
the existence of the new stakr and as to whether Maw
kiww of its location, specific that the Achters would not
lm:v 1mless that honndary were accepted; and Mr. Maw
replird that he knew where· the stake was and didn't
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need to go up with them to look at it, and that it was
acceptable (T. 63-66, 177).
Thereupon, and in relianee 011 that convcr::mtion and
the establishment of the point, Mr. and .Mrs. Achter
executed the U nifonn Heal Estate Contract on August
16, 1967 ( .1£x. 7), after Mr. Achter had noted on the
original of the Earnest I\loney Heceipt and Offer to
Purchase:
"A staked survey of subject property which is
to be approved in writing by buyer. 8igned K. F.
Achter 8/14/67." (Ex. 27)
Mr. and Mrs. Achter closed the transaction on
August 20, after .M.r. Achter had accepted the survey and
signed the Earnest Money Receipt on August 14, 1967
(Ex's. 7 and '27). Because of tliese dates and the signing
of the Earnest Money Receipt on August 2, it is not
possible that they could have been mistaken as to the
timing or that Mr. Achter and Mr. Burton could have
been mistaken as to the effect of the conversation with
Mr. Maw. The conversation with the title insurance
attorney plus the demands of Achter made the timing
and the subject matter as impressed upon the mind of
Mr. Burton as upon the mind of .M.r. Achter.
Mr. and Mrs. Maw Wl'l'e not aware in July and
August, 1967 of the timing of the events related to the
Achter purchase; and in n•calling the conversations later,
were naturally motivated h:• an effort to defe,.at the
claim of agre<·mcnt and estoppel pleaded
Mr Achter.
Mrs. I\law testified that in July, 1967 Achter and
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Burton came on hon:;es and announced that Achter was
interested in the 1Jropert:', and there was no discussion
of the boundary ( T. 345). Mr. Maw testified that Burton
eame on the property around July 20, 19G7 and told him
he had too much property in thL' waterfall area and there
was a discussion abont selling the place and whether
Maw could purchase the area around the waterfall (T.
402).
Mrs. Maw saw I\Ir. Burton on the property on
Xugust 12 when Dahl was there- making the survey, and
there was no mention then of a boundary (T. 346). Mr.
Maw did not testify to any conversation at the time of
the survey by Mr. Dahl.
Mrs. Maw testified that in August Burton and
Achter came to the property and stated that Achter
had purchased the proverty, and that Mr. Maw might
be interested in purcasing some more, but there was
no conversation about a boundary problem (T. 347). Mr.
Maw testified there was a discussion with Burton and
Achter on August 22 or 23 (T. 402). He was putting in
a spring then and Exhibit M was a check for a reduction
valve dated August 21, 1967, and it was after that that
Achkr and Burton came (T. 403-404). He was watering
new grass and Mr. Burton got a drink, which couldn't
have bren donP before August 20, and this was the first
time he ever met Mr. Achter, who was introduced as the
nevv" owner ( T. 405).
rrhey both testified that in May, 1968, Mr. Achter
eamo and checkrd tlw area around thP waterfall and
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became upset (T. 354 and 411).
Mr. Maw recalled a meeting with Burton and Achter
when the boundary was discussed and placed it at July
20 (T. 402). Achter testified that he met Maw for the
first time when they discussed the boundary, but that
the date was August 12 (T. 176). The August 12 meeting
is confirmed by Mrs. Maw as being the day of the survey,
but she does not recall Achter (T. 346), and both Achter
and Burton testified that their conversation was only
with Mr. Maw an<l not with Mrs. Maw. Mr. Maw then
testified that he met Mr. Achter for the first time on
August 20 ( r_r. 405), and of course the conversation would
have been meaningless had it been made after the consummation of the purchase and the Maws cannot be
believed in this matter.
This Court ha8 recognized the principles of equitable estoppel many times. For in8tance, Union Tarik
Car Company v. Wheat Brothen;, 15 Utah 2d 101, 387
P.2d 1000; East01i v. Wycoff, 4 Utah 2d 386, 295 P.2d
332; Petty v. Gindy Mfg. Company, 17 Utah 2d 321,
404 P.2d 30. We haven't found a Utah case dealing with
the establishment of a boundary point. The elements of
estoppel are set out in 28 Am. J ur. 2d, Estoppel and
Waiver, 35, as being as to the party estopped:
1. Concealment of facts or conduct which is calculated to convey the impn•ssion that the facts are inconsistent with those which the party subsequently
attempts to assert;
2. Expectation that the conduct will influence the
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other party; and
3. Actual or constructive knowledge of the real
facts.
The elements as to the party claiming the estoppel must
be:

1. Lack of knowledge and the means of knowledge
of the truth;
2. Reliance in good faith upon the conduct of the

party to be estopped; and
3. Action Lased on the representation amounting
to a change of position to his detriment.

In Rowell v. TVeinemann, 119 Iowa 25G, 93 N.W. 279,
the defendant purchased land from the plaintiff, the
plaintiff pointing out the boundaries of the land to the
defendant prior to sale. The plaintiff then sought to
re-establish the boundary lines in accordance with a subsequent survey, to do which the court held the plaintiff
was clearly estopped.
Likewise, in Hankins v. Dillfy, 206 S.W. 549 (Tex.
1918), an adjoining landowner pointed out the boundary
line to a prospective purchaser, upon which the purchaser
relied. \Vhcn the adjoining o\vner later brought suit to
declare the boundary erroneous, the court held him to
be estopped to deny the boundary he had indicated.
Again, in Fitch v. Wilsh, 94 Neb. 32, 142 N.W. 293
(191:3), two parties purchased adjoining land, one pointing out to the other the b01111dary between them along
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which the second purchaser built a fence. Seventeen
years later the one who pointed out the line brought an
action for ejectment and it was held that these facts
worked an estoppel against the claimant.
Colby v. Norton, 19 .Me. 412, 50 A.L.R. 853, 854,
holds that one who sees another take a deed in reliance
upon statements as to how far his land extends and a
valuable consideration is paid therefor, the person giving the information is concluded, and indeed:
''If he had witnessed such a conveyance, and had
been merely passive, it has been held that he
would have been concluded."

Appellants recognize that there was an issue raised
by the defendants. Their interests made it easy for
them to place the date of the conversation at a meaningless time, fix the date by tne unrelated circumstances of
paying bills and doing work and suggesting by their
testimony that after the plaintiffs had signed their contract of purchase, they were for the first time interested
in knowing what they had purchased. Furthermore, the
negotiations of Maw and Morton with LeR Burton as
reflected by the documents disclose no understanding
that the waterfall area was bargained for or available.
On the other hand, the Achters were interested in
the 32-acre tract only if the area South of the waterfall
was available as a home site. Their Earnest Money Offe.r
(Ex. 8) specifically and plainly gave them an out if the
survey and the establishment of boundary was not as
required. The only logical reconciliation of the testimony

14

is that the Achters required the survey and inspected the
property and made their decision before the deadline
of August 20 set in Bxhibit 8, and the date on Exhibit
27 of August 14, 1967 cannot be based on recollection,
circumstance or coincidence, but coincides precisely with
the testimony of Messrs. Burton and Achter given when
only Exhibit 8 was before the Court and prior to the
time that Mr. Burton discovered E..xhibit 27 among his
files.
The trial judge ma<le no effort to deal \\rith the issue
of estoppel, but disposed of the case by finding an agreement of the parties and therefore logically did not reach
the issue of estoppel. 'Ve submit that the ambiguity of
the documents on every issue except the estoppel issue,
the uncertainty in the reference to places not properly
utilized as monuments and the conflict generally as to
how the boundaries were determined, suggest that the
case should have been resolved on the issue of estoppel
and favorably to appellants.
POINT II
THERE WAS NO AGREEMENT AS TO THE
POINT NEAR THE WATERFALL.

The first point of the Court's :Memorandum Decision
was:
"That the plaintiffs failed to meet their burden
of proof and contention that .PB was the point
agreed upon by dt>fendants and their grant.or
R. Burton, and that defendants and Burton did
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agree upon a point referred to a:::; Pl." (R. 14)
The second cause of action of the amended complaint alleges agreement on a houndary based upon the
conversation between Mes:::;rs. Burton, Achter and Maw
on or about August 15, 1967 on the property, with
estoppel as an alternative to a finding of agreement.
One problem with the agreement theory is the statute
of frauds, which was not pleaded but could have been
injected.

It is not possible that the trial court could have
found that at the conversation on August 12, 1007,
Messrs. Burton, Achter and Maw agreed on the point
at the edge of the ledge overlooking the waterfall as
the boundary point in that area. No one so testified.
The Court, therefore, must have found that somehow the welter of contradictory evidence as to where
the parties stood at various times with reference to the
waterfall resulted in some sort of agreement between
Messrs. Burton, Maw and Morton that the point right
at the edge of the ledge was the division point, thereby
stranding, isolating, making inaccessible and useless the
residue of property East of that point, and consisting
of a triangle 700 x 700 x 200, plus the South slope of
the canvon of 700 x 700 x 75 (T. 169), a total of 96,250
square feet or roughly two and a quarter acres.
In reporting his view of the property, the Court
mentioned that he had observed points Pl, PB, the point
30 feet vVest of PB and the point 42 feet West of Pl.
A consideration of the testimony will show that there
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was no agreement whab:;oevcr as to any point. We invite
the Court to consider first the testimony as the several
parties gave it, and then to compare the documents and
the calculation:::; based upon the documents with the testimony of the several persons who participated in the
preparation of the docmnenb;.
No one testified that point Pl at the edge of the
ledge overlooking the waterfall was the point upon
which Messrs. Maw, Morton and Burton stood at the
time they made preliminary measurements and had preliminary conversations with reference to the preparation
of Exhibits 2 and 3.
Mr. Morton testified that the point at which the)>
stood was 35 or 40 feet Southwesterly from poin Pl (T.
265, 277-278, 287), and point Pl was first established or
claimed by anyone only when Mr. Dahl put a stake there
at Morton's direction (T. 221).
Mr. Maw testified that on their first measuring trip
they taped down the rocky canyon to the big rock and
then down a little farther from the big rock to the point
by the figure "279" on Exhibit A. He said the big rock
is 150 feet from the waterfall and 50 feet West of point
Pl (T.383). These measurements agree reasonably well
with Exhibit P28. The point they went to in connection
with the Exhibit 3 measuring was also 50 feet down from
point Pl where there is a smaller rock (T. 392).
Mr. Burton definitely testified that the point measun•d as 300 feet from the South boundary was 30 feet
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West of point PB, which is shown on Bxhibit 28 (T. 26,
37, 46 and Ex. 5).
In Finding of Fact No. 7 in lines G-7 (R. 19),
"The Court furtlwr finds that the defendants
and their grantor,
a corporation, did agree
upon the point rPfened to and identified in the
trial as point Pl."
and further in said Finding of Fact at lines 16-18:
"And that the said point picked
L<•R Burton on
behalf of LeR, a cor1 Jo ration, and the defendants
is the point surveyed by their surveyor, Rodney
Dahl."
'I1he evidence is that no one claiml'd, recognized, or
measured to the point Pl until the Rodney Dahl survey,
and there is no evidence to support the Court's Finding
of Fact as above quoted, upon which finding this case
was decided.
The disagreemnt is plain from the two surveys made
by Mr. Dahl. P6 was made at the instance of Messrs.
Morton and Maw, and they led Mr. Dahl to the edge of
the ledge and had him put a stake there. P5 was made at
the instance of Mr. Burton who directed Mr. Dahl to put
his stake at point PB, which was 78 feet South.
It is plain from a reading of Exhibit P2 that regardless of what anybody thought about the waterfall, the option in Exhibit P2 would have result<>d in placing Morton
and Maw far South of the waterfall and would have
left them very little creek frontage. The parties wNc
agreed that 700 feet \V<>st along the South rim of the canyon wall would haYc taken them well below the ·waterfall,
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and then the call North 50 feet morp or less to the center
line of the creek would have afforded the creek frontage
which the Maws desired. Bnt that description is:
to an option in fayor of the seller to reduce the total acreage to exactly 10 acres by purchase of the excess that may exist with $1.00 cash
* * * and in the absence of mutual agreemnt it
will begin with the Northerly 200 feet of the East
line of thP snb.ject property and continue West
along said North line, but in no case will it extend
closer than 180 feet to the South line of subject
property* * *."
Messrs . .Maw and Morton testified that they didn't
know what the effect of the exercise of that option would
be ('r. 303, 421-422). It is plain that the Northerly 200
feet of the East line would cut the North boundary in
half, since it was 400 feet along the quarter section line
to the South rim of the canyon wall. Then 200 feet would
be taken from the creek side of property extending West
as far as necessary to reduce the acreage of the remainder to Pxactly ten. Since no else had calculated the
effect of that process, Mr. Achter was asked to do so and
testified (and he is an engineer) that if the West 400 feet
were left at the required frontage width of 200 feet, the
property would be reduced to 180.29 feet
balance of
North of the Sonth boundary (T. 498-499). An examination of Exhibit G, which shows the distances from the
Houth boundary to the cr<'ek and to the edge of the ledge
near the waterfall, will show that the exercise of the
option on
2 would deprive the Maws of all creek
frontage Ea:.;t of about 950 feet and some of the creek
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frontage in the area of 797.34 feet East. In the area of
the waterfall the exercise of the option would have left
the Maws approximately :.mo feet from the edge of the
ledge.
The reason for the change from the description in
Exhibit 2 to the description in
3 was to increase
the acreage somewhat and to give Maw and Morton the
creek frontage in the area where they could water horses
(T. 308, 309), all of which pertained to the boundary
South of the call of "thence Southwesterly in a straight
of the vVest boundary line
line to a point 1400 feet
and in the center of the North Fork of Holmes Creek,
which is 200 feet, more or less, from the South boundary." The result of this was to give Maw 1400 feet of
creek frontage including both sides of the creek for approximately the West 400 feet. The course in Exhibit 2,
which ran North 50 feet to the center of the creek after
going 700 feet West from the East boundary, was eliminated indieating that the creek in the precipitous area was
not bargained for and was not to go to Maw. That point
on the creek is actually 967 feet from the East boundary
and the parties believed the creek to be 200 feet from the
South boundary at that point, whereas actually it was
267.4 according to Exhibit 6. With those facts in mind,
there is nothing about the description in
3 to
suggest that the point South of the waterfall was
intended to be any closer to the waterfall than 300
feet from the South boundary and in an area where the
creek on both sides was being rdained by the grantor.
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POINT III
IN THE ABSENCE OF AGREEMENT, THE DESCRIPTIONS ARE AMBIGUOUS AND THE MEASUREMENTS SHOULD CONTROL

At the threshold is the que::ition of whether the deed
is ambiguous and whether parol evidence was admissible
and the terms used.
to assist in construction of the
Thompson on Real Proverty, Vol. 6 3027.

-

Appellants' position, in accordance with the first
cause of action in the amended complaint, is that if a surveyor went 700 feet West and 300 feet North of the
Southeast corner of the tract of land shown on Exhibit 1,
he would not find anything which clearly and unmistakeably was a point "on top of the South rim of the North
Fork of Holmes Creek Canyon." Instead, as shown on
:PJxhibit 25, he would be at an area midway between the
edge of a rock ledge overlooking waterfall and the high
high point of a straight line running North and South
700 feet West of the East boundary of the property. LeR
Burton described this as a point from which a person
would descend to the main r){)rtion of the Maw property
and also to the waterfall area and the creek (T. 84) and
that this is, therefore, a point on top of the South rim
and the deed is nnambinguous. Alton F. Lund testified
that the reference in Exhibit 4 is not to a monument but
to a measured point. It is unfortunate. that Messrs. Burton, Morton and Maw did not at the time recognize the
significance of refen'nce to the waterfall area and measure to a distance a cPrtain number of fed from the edge

a
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of the rocky le<lge OVl'rlooking the waterfall, which would
be readily ascertained. The reference of 300 feet from
the South boundary is equally definite, although not
quite so readily ascertainable as of that time, but the addition of "more or less" challenges the simple Rrocedure
of measuring 700 feet \Vest and 300 feet North.'
Th evidence is that by locating the point 700 feet
West and 300 feet North all clauses of the deed are used
and all are consistent. If all provisions are harmonized,
the interpretation is reasonable. LcBa.ron v. Crimson,
100 Ariz. 206, 412 P .2d 705, 70Li. That case also holds
that interpretation of deeds is for the Supreme Court,
independent of the trial court's findings. lt approves the
rule that a deed is:
"ambiguous and subject to instruction only if it
is not possible to relate the description to the
land without inconsistency."
We consider the matter further, in case the court is
not satisfied that parol evidence "·as ncessary to aid
construction and interpretation.
An examination of Exhibits 2, 3, 4, 10, 11 and 21 discloses that the scriveners, who were Messrs. Burton and
Morton, knew how to describe a course which runs to an
ascertainable monument. Thus, in Exhibit 2 the description runs "North along the quarter section line to the
South rim of canyon wall which is 400 feet" and then
later "North 50 feet, more or less, to the center line of

22

the North Fork of the Holmes Creek"; and in the rightof-way the description runs "to a point where the Northmeets the subject property and a pipeline
easterly
easement." Also, in 1£xhibit 3 the description starts at
the West en.d and runs East "to the quarter section line"
and later, "to a point 1,400 feet I!Jast of the West boundary line and in the center of the North Fork of Holmes
Creek, which is 200 feet, more or less, from the South
boundary." Exhibit 4 is similar to Exhibit 3, except that
the crucial call is "to a point 700 feet West of the East
line of subject vropBrty and 300 feet North, more or less,
from the South line of subject property" which is the
same up to that point in both deeds, but then in Exhibit
3 the incidental reference is "being the South rim of the
North Fork of Holmes CrePk Canyon" and in Exhibit 4
is "being on top of the South rim of the North Fork of
Holmes Creek Canyon." Exhibit 10 was prepared by Mr.
Morton and although not copied from the deed (T. 313),
there is no change in the reference to the point South of
the waterfall. Exhibit 11 recognizes the problem by a call
"Northwesterly in a straight line to a point which is 700
feet West of the East boundary and on the South boundary of grantor's land" and then makes it subject to correction by a qualified survey. In Exhibit 21 Mr. Morton
clarified this call
providing "thence North 75°42'10"
West 722.46 feet to a point on the South rim of the North
Fork of Holmes Creek Canyon 378.15 feet North and 700
feet \Vest of the Southeast property corner", which is
an amplification of this call from Exhibit 6 prepared by
the snrve)'or.
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Thus, it is plain that ability to tie to a determinable
point existed in the scriveners, which suggests that the
point on which the parties stood when Exhibit 3 was
contemplated was not a definikly determinable monument, but a rather general area which was simply "being
on top of the South rim."
Ordinarily, reference to a monument take:::; precedence over courses and distance:::;. Scott 1/. Hansen, 18
Utah 2d 303, 422 P .2d 525 :

" * * * fixed rnomum·nt:::; or markers of a pennan-

cnt nature which can be definitely identified and
located take precedence over calls of courses and
distance:::;'" ''' ." (Em1)ha:::;is :::;upplied)
Incidental reference:::; to an area do not constitute a
controlling tic to a monument. Southwestern Settlement
and Developmc11t Company v. Stctnburg, (Tex. 1923) 248
S.W. 108, recognizes the difference of calls to monuments which are merely incidental and those which are
"locative", which case is footnoted at 11 C.J.S. 1T 50 (f)
(2) (c):
"And an incidental call for a natural monument
should be giv0n but little, if an.\·, prnbative force,
and is secondary in importance to a call for course
and distanc<', which will prevail over the former
in locating a corner." P. GlO
W caver v. H ou;att, 171 Cal. 302, 152 P. 925, was a
complicated problem of locating a boundary where the
original :::;urvey markern had been lost, the monument

placed by the surveyor had been obliterated, the distances to the marker were found not to be accurate because of the field notes of the surveyor, the monuments
referred to were incidental only, and yet the survey had
been made and the problem could not be treated as
though there had been no smvey and no location of the
monument. rrhe court had previom;ly directed the trial
court to fix the corner:
"at a point where it will best
with the
natural objects described in the field notes as being about it, and found to exist on the ground,
and which is least inconsistent with the distances
mentioned in the notes and plat."
The court reconciled the conflicting means of locating a
point with the following reasoning:
urrhe appellants contend that the references in the
field note::; and map to the natural objects, by
which the site of the corner is now determined,
are mere 'incidental' calls, and not 'locative' calls,
and hence that they should yield to distances. It
is true that they are incidental calls, But incidental calls may be resorted to for the purpose of ascertaining a located corner where the locative
calls have all disappeared, or cannot be identified,
and there are no means, other than the incidental
call8, of ascertaining the place where the locative
monument for the corner was placed by the surveyor. They may or may not be allowed to prevail over the courses and distances according to
the circumstances of the case; but in a case like
this, where the locative monument is gone, and
the place incapable of identification, where the
distances noted in the survey as locative of the
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corner are manifestly erroneous, such distances
should give way to the natural objects noted and
found upon the ground at approximately the: distances giYen in tlw notes, even if the calls for
such natural objects are incidental and not 'locative'." (P. 928)
If in that case the distances had been reliable and usable,
there would have been no other problem. Garnsey v.
Poston, 52 Cal. App. 2d 828, 127 P.2d 17, also holds that
monuments, when incidental and at intermediate points,
yield to distances.

In the instant case the distance of 300 feet from
the South boundary satisfies the requirements of Maw
and Morton, who expected to get more than ten acres and
around eleven (T. 307). By proceeding from this point,
which is point PB, to the center of the creek 260 feet
away gives all of the creek where it is usable and does not
have a steep descent to Maw and Morton, and locates
the point in the precise East-West plane where the witness Burton testified it should be, as shown on Exhibits
28 and A.
This di1-1position of the problem of locating the point
would also be consistent with the development of language through 11-Jxhibist 2, 3 and 4 as contained on Exhibit 22. Exhibit 2 runs a line to the South rim of the
canyon wall, which is definitely locative, and Exhibit 3
departs from that canyon wall and obviously goes South
of it because it proceeds "N orthwcsterly in a straight
line" instead of proceeding along the rngged and irregu-
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Jar canyon wall; and if it were intended to go into the
creek, that would have been described; and if it were
intended to nse the same point on top of the canyon
wall, there would have been no occasion to depart from
the language "to the Sonthrim of the canyon wall, 700
feet West." Then it appears that the language from Exhibit 3, "being the South rim of the North Fork" required
some clarification so that Exhibit 4 made this "being on
top of the South rim," which distinguishes it from the
l·dge of the rocky ledgP, or the edge of the overlook, or
the top of the South rim of the canyon wall, any one of
which would have aptly described the point at the edge
of the rocky ledge where there is an overlook of the
waterfall basin.
It is plain that in preparing the description for Exhibit 3 Messrs. Burton and Maw were describing a smaller tract than the outside perimeter in Exhibit 2. That is
of necessity true, since the East line was 200 feet instead of 400 feet and to the South rim of the canyon wall.
In Exhibit 2 the next call is "West along said South rim
of the canyon wall 700 feet", which would give a point
still on the canyon wall, but some 150 feet west of waterfall. If the intention had been only to cut out a pieshaped piece in the Northeast corner of the tract without
getting any farther away from the waterfall, the only

logical d0velopnwnt of the description would have been
to go from the 200-foot point on the East boundary
Northwesterly to a point on the South rim of the canyon
wall 700 fed "\\Test of the East boundary, and then go
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North 50 feet to the center of the creL'k. Instead of doing
that, the call as prepared was to go to a point for which
coordinates were given, and then instead of going North
to the center of the creek, the call was "Southwesterly gi
in a straight line to a point 1,400 East of the \Vest tl
boundary line and in the center of the North Fork of c
Holmes Creek which is 200 feet, more or less from South ]
boundary." Obviously intPnding that that line North to l
the creek and East of the 1,400-foot mark was a piece
worth describing and worth retaining by the grantor.
This would be a meaningless gesture if the point were
from the edge of the rocky ledge Southwest to a point
in the center of the creek, since that would have retained
to the grantor only the slope from the top of the canyon
wall or the edge of the ledge down to the center of the
stream in an area which was precipitous and unusable.
This reinforces the view that the 300 feet, more or less,
was to a point which was approximately 300 feet from an
area which satisfied the parties that it was the South
boundary; and if the parties cannot agree on what that
point was, the logical conclusion is to treat the "300 feet,
more or less" as 300 fed, which coincides precisely with
the recollection and the testimony of the grantor LeR
Burton.
This construction can be made from the deed itself
as an unambiguous deed and is the only logical construction based upon parol and documentary evidence meeting
the requiremrt of reconciling the trrms of the document.
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St"i\LI\IARY AND CONCLUSION

h

It fully appears that Morton, Maw and Burton ney gotiated a ten-acre tract description along the South of
t this 43-acre tract shown on Exhibit 1. When Burton bef came free to increase the acreage it was important to
l\faw and Morton to increase the frontage on the creek,
but there was never any question about conveying everything South of the creek and the grantor retained both
sides of the creek East of a point 1,400 feet gast of the
highway and some 360 feet West of the waterfall. It was
only reasonable that with four acres or more of ground
on the South side of the creek, the grantor would include
in his retainage the usable area South of the waterfall
to give value to that land and render usable the land to
by crossthe East of it, which could be approached
ing the creek West of the waterfall and including the
level ground South of the waterfall. r:rlw dt>velopment of
the language was reasonable and consisent with these
objectives when non-experts were doing the drafting.

Then the defrndants concluded that the description
was ambiguous and that Burton had not been as skillful
as he might have bren, and so they had Dahl ignore the
300 feet, more or less, limitation by reading "on top of
the South rim'' as though it
"the edge of the rocky
ledge" or "to the Sonth rim of the canyon wall." T'o further this, Exhibit 21 wm; prepared
Morton as the QuitClaim Deed to Maw, which goes to a point 378.15 North
and 700 feet ""\Vpst of tlw South(>ast corner, which deed
was made January 1G, 1967 but not recorded until well
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after the Achter purchase and the arising of this contro.
versy.
But when Burton decided to sell the rest of the prop.
erty and Maw was confronted face to face with decision
of establishing the boundary, he acquiesced in the survey
stake that had been made, and the Achters were satisfied
and purchased the re8t of the property. The circumstances of the Achter purchase and the timing from
August 2 to August 20 wen' such that the Achters could
not have been rni8taken as to the dates and 8equence of
those events.
In the conversation with Ma\v thl' improper boundary fences, the wrong roadway, as ·well as the boundary
in the area of the waterfall were all discussed and acquiesecd in, very reluctantly complied with and finally
the lawsuit was neces8ary on the waterfall Lonndary.
The deed (Ex. 4) contains measurements of 700 feet
West and 300 fod North, more or les8, from the Southeast corner, being on top of the North Fork of Holmes
from that
Creek. If the top were a few feet
point, there would be no inconsistency and the point a
few feet away should bo accepted. But when it appears
that the top on that line is 74 feet to the South, that is
not reasonable or consistent and nPitlwr Burton nor the
Achters have suggested that solution. Neither is it rea·
sonable or consistent to go 78.15 feet North from the 300foot mark when that is going downward and certainly
not to the top; and there is no justification for going to
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the edge of the ledge, or to "the top of the South rim of
the canyon \Vall."
Although the scriveners knew how to locate a monument, it is plain that in Exhibits 3 and -!, the Southwest
call from the East boundary was not to a monument, but
to a point with an approximate distance. Since there is
no monument at that point, the logical construction is to
eliminate the "more or less" and establish the point at
700 feet West and 300 feet North of the Southeast corner
of the tract.
rrhe Court should grant the motion for new trial
"·ith directions either to find the estoppel or to give
further consideration to the issue of estoppel; or failing
that, the Court must find that the parties did not agree
on a point at the 700-foot vVest line and that the descriptions in Exhibits 2, 3 and 4 mnst be construed by the
Court and din•d, in accordance with sound rules of construction, that the point be located at 700 feet West and
300 fret North of the Southeast corner.
Respectfnlly submitted,
RICHARD8, BIRD
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